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EDITORIAL ii 
EDITORIAL 
Para pembaca yang terhormat, 
Segala puji hanya ditujukan kepada Allah Subhanahu Wata 'ala yang 
tiada putus melimpahkan rahmatNYA, sehingga JURNAL HUKUM 
HUMANITER dapat kembali ke tangan para pembaca yang budiman. 
Edisi kal i  ini  secara khusus membahas masalah pemberontakan, baik 
menurut konsepnya secara umum maupun mengenai sejarahnya di 
Indonesia pasca kemerdekaan.  Terkait dengan pelanggaran­
pelanggaran yang terjadi dalam hal pemberontakan yang umumnya 
mewaj ibkan angkatan bersenjata negara untuk mengatasi hal 
tersebut, maka dikemukakan pula sistem hukum pidana mil iter yang 
berlaku di berbagai negara dan khususnya yang berlaku di Norwegia 
dan Indonesia. Di samping itu, dikemukakan pula teori dan praktek 
mengenai kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan, sebagai salah satu jenis 
kejahatan yang dapat terjadi baik pada waktu perang maupun di 
masa damai. 
Sebagai lanjutan dari "Kolom" mengenai Konvensi Senjata-senjata 
Konvensional Tertentu (1980) yang terbit di edisi yang lalu, maka 
edisi ini memuat kelengkapan Konvensi tersebut; yakni terjemahan 
dari lima buah Protokolnya. Mengingat Protokol-protokol tersebut 
bersifat sal ing melengkapi, maka kelimanya sekaligus diterbitkan 
dalam edisi ini sehingga merupakan merupakan kesatuan yang utuh 
dalam melengkapi isi Konvensi. 
Atas terlaksananya penerbitan JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER ini, kami 
mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Inte rnational Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) ya ng se l a l u  berkom itmen t ingg i  da l am 
pengembangan hukum humaniter d i  tanah air, termasuk mendukung 
penerbitan edisi ke tiga ini .  Akhirnya, kami mengharapkan masukan 
dari pembaca baik berupa kritik maupun saran konstruktif lainnya. 
Selamat membaca . 
Redaksi 
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INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY 
SOME CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS 
Nils Marius Rekkedal1 
Abstract 
This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use 
when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doc­
trines and rules), to describe the different forms of insurgency. 
One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent 
wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. 
The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible 
to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of war­
fare also. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts 
and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and meth­
ods of Insurgency as well. 
A. Foreword and Introduction 
''Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropri­
ate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil 
servant in normal times are not n ecessarily the right ones in 
counterinsurgency operations. A soldier fired on in conven­
tional wa r who does not fire back with every available weapon 
would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the reve rse  would 
be true in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to 
apply the minimum of fire." 
(David Galula, Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964) 
What relevance do earlier wars have for developments today? 
Undeniably, the world has, of course, changed greatly since the 1960s. 
The traditional source of inspiration for the many insurgent wars 
during the last half of the 20th Century, the different versions of 
' Nils Marius Rekkedal is a Professor War Studies, especially Military Theory at the Swedish National 
Defense College, Stockholm. This article will consist of a three part, the first part is published in this 
volume, while for the second and the third part will be published in the next two volume. 
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Communist doctrine, have clearly lost much of their earlier strong 
appeal .  What then are the sources of inspiration today? A natural 
question to ask, since there are still a great number of wars going 
on. It is probably difficult to give a clear answer today. However, I 
would l ike here to try to provide a contribution to the ongoing debate 
surrounding the factors that trigger and maintain wars - particularly 
in the Third World.  
I would l ike to present and discuss several of the key concepts 
in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in 
doctrines and rules), to describe the different forms of insurgency. 
One of my assumptions in this work has been that al l  insurgent wars 
are different, with their own local or regional conditions. It is also my 
opinion that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain 
basic characteristics in these forms of warfare also. There is much to 
indicate that the world has been permanently changed over the course 
of the last few years. But, at the same time, there is little to indicate 
that the fundamental reasons for people choosing to employ armed 
force against political, ethnic or religious opponents have changed. 
These factors, which are often formulated in military theory under 
the collective concept 'the nature of war', appear to have remained 
largely unchanged by time. This makes it possible to study (and de­
scribe) the reasons for insurgencies starting. In the ongoing interna­
tional debate, some commentators have drawn parallels between, 
among other things, the insurgent/resistance movements in Afghani­
stan and Iraq and earlier insurgencies against Western colonial pow­
ers, and have asserted that these occupations can be seen as part of 
the US's so-called 'neo-colonial' thinking. 2 
Almost al l dominant models and thinking about how states are 
established and evolve assume developments similar to the ones in 
Western Europe. This gives us grounds for looking critically at whether 
these theories can simply be applied to the new nation states in the 
Third World that were established during decolonisation after the 
2 William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower, new updated edition (London: 
Zed Books, 2002); Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century: The State, Military Connict and the 
International System (Maldan. MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001); 
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Second World War. The same theories have probably also provided a 
simplified presentation of the historically lengthy and extremely vio­
lent period that lies behind today's relatively stable Western and Central 
Europe. An important observation, as I see it, is that one should 
stress the importance of the so-called irregular armed forces, i .e ., 
militias, paramilitaries, guerrilla forces, mercenaries, gangs of ban­
dits and local 'police' that together constitute 'the armed forces' in 
many Third World countries today. These problems are discussed in 
later chapters (see, for instance, Chapters 3 and 4). The irregular 
forces in these states are perhaps at least as important for the gen­
eral security situation as a state's regular armed forces. It is also 
important to point out that, in parts of the Third World, a state's 
legitimacy is not something that comes naturally. The legitimacy to 
govern the state is constantly challenged by various forms of irregu­
lar forces that operate within a given state's formal borders. There is 
probably much truth in what Professor Achilles Batalas has written in 
connection with his studies of nation-building and the consequences 
of irregular mil itary units in the middle of the 17th Century in Greece: 
'Send a thief to catch a thief'. 3 
Another reason for constant conflicts is, as previously indicated, 
due to different ethnic groups with a long tradition of conflict be­
tween them either being 'squeezed together' within a country or 
borders going right through an ethnic group's traditional territory. 4 In 
modem times, we in Europe have, for example, seen antagonism 
between Protestants/Catholics in Northern Ireland and Basques ver­
sus Spaniards. Europe's most infamous recent ethnic conflicts took 
place in the Balkans in the period 1991-1999, where both states and 
ethnic groups have used violence to solve their problems. Today, this 
is perhaps the primary threat to existing states in the Third World. 
George F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton, Islam at War. A History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 
"http://oldwww.schoolofvisualarts.edu/04.Studio/Undergraduate/HumanitiesSciences/Faculty.html. His study 
is also printed in the following book: Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces 
and Their Role in Politics and State Fonnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 6. 
• For example, the Kurdish people are split between the states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Armenia. In 
three of these states, Kurdish insurgent movements have been active in recent times. The Albanian people 
are, on the other hand, split between the states of Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania and have 
fought three insurgent wars since 1998. 
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B. Concepts and Problems 
1. In general 
In this Chapter, some of the key concepts and problems regard­
ing insurgency and guerrilla warfare are introduced. One intention 
has been to see which patterns of behaviour fit in with the wars that 
are going on today. Knowledge of the fundamental features of insur­
gency and insurgent warfare should be of assistance in  attempting to 
investigate what could be potential strategic choices for the insur­
gents in future conflicts. 
2. Introduction 
Many people, including the author, sympathise with the rela­
tively common view that one should try to learn from the histories of 
others and oneself, and especially from mistakes that have previ­
ously been made. One problem is, however, that one may succumb 
to the temptation of drawing diredparallels from one historical set­
ting to another. Since al l wars have their own special causes and are 
always conducted in  a given cultural and geographical area, they wil l 
also lead to a locally adapted military and political course of events. 
It is consequently seldom the case that it is possible to directly com­
pare two situations and, if we nevertheless succumb to the tempta­
tion of doing this and introduce solutions that worked in a historical 
situation in a completely different setting, it is most l ikely that this 
wil l not work as hoped. 
Every insurgency has its own unique causal connection. If we 
were to try to il lustrate this we could perhaps make a comparison 
with the DNA chain found in science. If the war going on in Iraq in 
2006 can be said to contain the 'DNA components� A, C, F and X, the 
war in Algeria in the 1950s perhaps also contained A and C, but 
lacked F and X. Instead, the components E and G were involved 
here. The differences between the two wars are so great that it is 
difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to try to draw too many gen-
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 2, No. 3 
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eral and universal conclusions. 5 Another important point made by 
the American mil itary thinker Will iam S. Lind about today's warfare is 
that what 'Fourth Generation opponents' actually do to a state is not 
'playing mind-games with the state's leaders'. The leadership of a 
successful rebellion/insurgency use the powe r of weakness to bring 
the opposing state's population to regard the war as an abomination 
- it must be stopped. Lind writes: 
Historians long ago recognized that official decisions, including for 
war or peace, are vastly more complex events in which non-rational 
factors play decisive roles. In fact, modern decision theory recognizes 
not only that decisions made by governments do not follow a "ratio­
nal" business model, neither do most business decisions. Non-ratio­
nal, often irrational, considerations dominate both . 
( ... ) Paradoxically, the more the state is successful in winning on the 
battlefield by turning its immense, hi-tech firepower on guys in bath­
robes who are armed only with rusty World War II rifles, the more it 
becomes disgusted with itself. The weaker the Fourth Generation en­
emy is physically, the stronger he is morally. And the moral level is 
decisive.6 
Because of the historically very different experiences from one 
war to the next, it is consequently likely that it is only more general 
experiences that we can hope to learn something from - and we 
should also be content with this. In each actual new situation that 
arises, we should carry out a fundamental analysis of the likely unique 
political, cultural, religious and military conditions before any evalua­
tion and becoming involved in any particular conflict 'from the out­
side'.7 We can see from this that challenges with regard to intel li-
5 If we were to try a more scientific example, we could perhaps talk of individual conflicts having their 
own unique composition but we should note in this respect that the human 'building blocks'/components 
are and have been by and large the same throughout history - human genetics have not changed 
significantly in the last 3-4,000 years, but how we build and maintain societies has clearly changed. 
•William S. Lind, 'Critics of the Fourth Generation: the Good. the Bad and the Ugly', http://www.d-n­
i.net/lind/lind 1 10 06.htm 
7 An observation: if-we choose, for example, to look at the development of the Norwegian Army in the 
light of the above, we see what could be called the 'Kosovo/Bosnia syndrome'. Particularly as many 
officers have been in Bosnia and Kosovo, the experiences of this involvement are used as the basis for 
a new military structure. It is not chosen to establish a flexible ('generic') structure, but instead the 
'Kosovo/Bosnia scenario' forms the basis. In theory at least, a structure based on historical experience 
will be less robust/flexible seen in relation to future unknown operations in which the structure may be 
put to use. In fact, the ability to deal with the unknown and the unexpected is more related to the level 
of training and professionalism of the soldiers at all levels in a deployment or an incident. 
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gence in particular will be important if someone from 'the First World' 
considers intervening directly in conflicts in 'the Third World'. This 
type of analysis will require much experience of intelligence and ac­
cess to a whole series of different information and sources, as well as 
a great ability to be able to analyse these factors in a relevant man­
ner. 
We should also note that the two superpowers, the Soviet Union 
and the US, were 'indirectly at war' with each other several times 
after the Second World War even although there was never a direct 
military confrontation between the two during the Cold War. In the 
period after the Second World War, al l  superpowers, including the 
newer (regional) ones such as India and China, have been directly or 
indirectly involved in local or regional wars. Also, since the end of the 
Cold War in 1991, most of the world's superpowers have been in­
volved in conflicts. This has typically taken the form of wars with 
smaller neighbouring states or ethnic separatist movements that want 
to break away. Conflicts of the latter variety are stil l going on in 
Chechnya and Kashmir. Another variant has been where a super­
power supports a separatist movement in the locality, such as Russia's 
support for the insurgents in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Moldova . 
Si nce the Second World War, we have seen developments 
characterised by so-called 'asymmetric conditions', i .e., warfare where 
direct confrontation with a stronger opponent and his strengths is 
avoided. The inferior party instead decides to strike his opponent 
where he is weakest. In practice, this can mean anything from tradi­
tional guerrilla tactics to attacks that are exclusively directed at eco­
nomic or civilian targets. 
Today there is much to suggest that this development wil l con­
tinue. Such an interpretation can be countered by asking the ques­
tion: does the term 'asymmetric warfare' actually add anything radi­
cally new compared with well-established terms such as guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism. When becoming involved in operations against 
an 'asymmetric' opponent, it is important to acquaint oneself with 
the parameters and assumptions upon which the opponent is build­
ing his mil itary capacity and battle concept and direct one's own 
operations against the weaknesses found in these. In my opinion, 
this is actually a relatively conventional view. The problem with asym-
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 2, No. 3 
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metry is probably most relevant in the description of conflicts of the 
type going on between Israel and Palestine and in Iraq. This is a 
form of war that the West has not yet developed effective concepts 
for. Nevertheless, in order to be able to deal with local or, at most, 
regional conflicts, it is vital to understand what concepts such as 
asymmetry and asymmetric warfare actually involve, both at a theo­
retical and practical level .  The concepts of asymmetry and terrorism 
are difficult to ignore today as they are much used in l iterature. 
3. Methods of Insurgency - a Brief Overview 
If it is appropriate to see insurgency as a political phenomenon 
where the fight for power is the key element, a whole series of meth­
ods that can be used to achieve this goal must exist. Often the basis 
for the mobilisation of people is a combination of the following fac­
tors: ideology, rel igion, 8 a feeling of being subjected to an injustice, 
ethnicity and a rapidly increased sense of national identity. A combi­
nation of these factors could lead to the formation of a constituency 
of interest strong enough to provide the recruiting ground for a ma­
jor insurgency against authorities and their forces. 
Seen in isolation, ideology is hardly of any decisive importance 
because it is too elite-oriented in form, and insurgents who have 
unilaterally invested in this factor have historically only become a 
marginal group. It was therefore seldom able to mobil ise a people 
that was largely satisfied with the state of affairs, even if a significant 
amount of terrorism is used. The people must feel that they have 
good reason for becoming involved in insurgency. Ideology is prob­
ably never the only reason; there must be a more tangible basis such 
as, for example, an unfair division of economic benefits and/or a lack 
of a future for a large percentage of the population. But it may also 
be a matter of a struggle between power elites who use religion/ 
nationalism/ethnicity, etc., as a means of getting national groups to 
8 There are several variants of 'religious conflicts'. The conflict may either be part of a 
struggle for national identity as in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and, later, in 
Chechnya. During the conflicts in the Balkans, religious differences were particularly important 
to the Serbs in their wars against other ethnic groups. A third, and purer, variant of 'religious 
conflicts' is the 'global religious war' as al-Qaeda often portrays its struggle. 
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involve themselves directly as insurgents. 9 
Often insurgencies of this type have led to problems for the 
conventional mil itary forces that have been used in this type of war­
fare. Today there is much to suggest that this development will con­
tinue. In order to be able to deal with local or, at most, regional 
conflicts, it is important to understand what concepts such as, for 
example, asymmetry, asymmetric warfare, guerril la warfare and ter­
rorism actually stand for, in theory and in connection with local prac­
tice. 
Insurgent wars may obviously be 'war by proxy', which was of­
ten spoken of during the Cold War, but this is not normally the case 
in today's situation .10 It is 'normal' in today's situation for the wars 
we see to have local causes. 
Civil wars of the protracted variety, including the associated guer­
rilla campaigns and (local) use of terror against the civilian popula­
tion, always constitute a great social problem. In addition to many 
human l ives being lost in direct acts of war each year, wars of this 
type have a number of barely controllable extended effects. Some 
examples are shown below and the points also indicate a number of 
common features in these conflicts: 
1 .  In  contrast to wars between states, civil wars, conducted as 
guerri l la wars, normally last many years. Often the wars last for 
between 15  and 20 years, but some, such as the one that has 
now ended in Guatemala, have lasted even longer. The first at­
tempt at a major insurgency in Guatemala was started in 1962 
by Fuerzas Armadas Rebe/des (FAR), the Rebel Armed Forces, 
• See, for example, Nils Marius Rekkedal, Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism - An 
Assessment (The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library 5-2002). The text, 
which was written in the spring of 2002, has, after being greatly updated and expanded, 
been used as the basis of the text here. There has been much research/study of the 
phenomenon of asymmetric warfare since September 11, 2001, and parts of the international 
material have been used here. See footnotes and the bibliography. 
10 One exception is perhaps the Hezbollah organisation which some sources see as the 
extended arm of Iran in Lebanon, and which has traditionally received support from the 
'secularly' governed country, Syria. 
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but was, in practice, defeated during the period 1966-1967. In 
the 1970s, we saw a new insurgency, led by groups such as the 
Guerrilla Army of the Poor or Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres 
(EPG)11 and later also by the Guatemalan National Revolution­
ary Unily(URNG). The URNG was only a formal merger of FAR, 
the EGP and a group called the Organisation of the People in 
Arm� ORPA. Even although some Communist countries sup­
ported these attempted insurgencies, the insurgents were never 
successful in taking over government in Guatemala and the war 
was formally ended in 1996. As part of the counter-insurgency, 
we saw here the government forces carrying out a comprehen­
sive 'counter-terror' by, among other things, kidnapping and killing 
suspected sympathisers of the guerrilla movement.12 The gov­
ernment forces also committed major breaches of human rights, 
including regular massacres of the country's Indian population . 13 
2 .  Ethnic wars such as  those in  Eritrea, Burma and Laos have also 
typically lasted a long time. The war in the eastern part of Burma 
has been going on since 1948. 
3 .  The acts of war are often combined with terrorist campaigns. 
Typically we see a combination of both state terrorism and ter­
rorism on the part of the insurgents, directed at what they see 
as the 'reluctant' elements of the civilian population. This type 
of warfare often leads to streams of refugees (both internally 
and possibly over into neighbouring countries) . 
4. The areas devastated by war have a tendency to become a sanc­
tuary for extremely violent political groups. Today, some of these 
groups may often be 'imported' from abroad, cf., what happened 
11 The Guerrilla Army of the Poor is abbreviated as EGP. 
12 Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical. and Bibliographical Sourcebook 
(Westport, CO.: Greenwood Press, 1 996), pp. 1 48-149. The foreign support was probably not very 
large. The support principally went to the FMLN in El Salvador, which was a priority. Those providing 
support were probably thinking along the lines of 'Yesterday Nicaragua. today El Salvador, tomorrow 
Guatemala'. 
13 According to calculations carried out by the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), over 200,000 
people were killed during the civil war in Guatemala. Of those breaches of human rights and killings that 
the Commission investigated, 93 per cent had been carried out by the country's security forces or their 
paramilitary groups. By comparison, the insurgents were responsible for 3 per cent. 83 per cent of the 
victims were Maya Indians. (See text on the Internet: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ cehlreport/english/ 
conc1.html) 
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with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and most recently in  connection 
with the ongoing guerrilla and terrorist activity in Iraq. 
5. The war/conflict normally leads to poor economic growth in the 
area devastated by war as a lmost no one dares to invest in 
actual (or potential) areas of conflict. 
6. Warfare in a country can directly or indirectly generate political 
instabil ity in neighbouring countries. 
7. War has often historically shown itself to lead to the spread of 
epidemic diseases - today the lack of control over several dan­
gerous diseases in Africa in particular is a constant problem. 
The ability of the authorities to provide public health services, 
etc., in war-torn areas is then limited .  The insurgents often see 
al l activities financed and supported by the central authorities 
as part of the government's counter-insurgency. At the same 
time, they have neither the capacity for nor an interest in imple­
menting similar projects themselves. The civilian population is 
again often affected - it is difficult to be neutral in this type of 
internal war. 
8. When a lengthy war has first occurred in an area, the experi­
ence of history suggests that there is a great danger of new 
conflicts breaking out in the same area, even several years after 
a formal conclusion of peace. Much hatred and bad blood exist 
between the actual ethnic and/or political groups and it often 
does not take much before one sees a fresh outbreak of acts of 
war. It can also be noted in this respect that the conclusion of 
peace often results in an increase in criminal activity in the area 
when thousands of young men who only have experience of 
warfare are faced with finding something to live on . 
This categorisation of conflicts also helps to put the spotlight on 
the need for a fresh evaluation of the actual concept of armed forces. 
If we are to understand the ongoing changes, we should discuss 
these in a wider context since many European countries are increas­
ingly participating in warfare outside their traditional localities. Former 
colonial powers such as Great Britain and France have a certain ex­
perience of this type of warfare. For most other NATO or EU mem-
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bers, participation in this type of conflict is, on the other hand, some­
thing new and neither their training nor their equipment is yet fully 
adapted to the new situation.14 As previously pointed out, there are 
many reasons for this type of civil war/low-intensity conflict (UC) 
breaking out and it is, in practice, difficult to identify any set pattern 
as to how this type of war both starts and can be ended. Some main 
types of conflict stand out and can provide some pointers with re­
gard to what may contribute to bringing these conflicts to an end. 
Nevertheless, a locally acceptable and permanent solution m ust be 
created - or else it is likely that a fresh conflict will erupt again within 
a relatively short time.1s 
Poor countries not only have the longest wars; this is where 
living conditions are so poor that wars are very likely to flare up 
again, even if a (formal) peace agreement has been agreed between 
the warring parties. 16 The reasons that are most important for this 
trend are difficult to establish/document. It could, for exam ple, be 
because the machinery of government in a poor country is normally 
weak, i .e ., the government does not have an effective police 
organisation and military force available to quickly suppress an insur­
gency. Consequently, seen from the regime's point of view, it is often 
indiscriminate about offers of help from outside. Such help is most 
l ikely to trigger the provision of aid and resources to the other side in 
the conflict, often from states in the same region with a hostile atti­
tude to the ruling regime. 
,. It is perhaps possible to split this into three traditional approaches: (1) National territorial defence (as 
we have traditionally focused on in the Nordic countries), (2) A 'laissez-faire' attitude, i.e., lets otheni 
take the responsibility and burdens and be content ourselves to take 'the moral high ground' and (3) 
Actively take part in the defence of the country's interests abtoad (in the current areas of conflict) in 
order to avoid it spilling over into one's own counl!y (this could be said to be Noiway's new strategy - for 
the time being). 
15 There is comprehensive literature on insurgency and counter-insurgency. Some of the most important 
books are: Marc Jason Gilbert (ed.), Why the North Won the Vietnam war (New York: Palgrave, 2002); 
Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger (eds.). France and the Algerian War. 1954-62: Strategy, 
Operations and Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The 
Classical Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 1965/2002); Roger W. Barnett, 
Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 
2003); John Gray, Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modem (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2003); 
Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books Ltd .. 2003); Chris E. 
Stout. Psychology of Terrorism: Coping with the Continuing Threat. Condensed Edition (London: Praeger, 
2004). 
1• See the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments. Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2003), Appendix 2, for figures regarding the various wani in Africa and Asia. 
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Many governments also struggle with a lack of legitimacy and 
can be suspected of preferring to have a military apparatus that is 
weak but loyal to avoid an internal military coup. In other situations, 
governments wil l have problems mobilising the armed forces in an 
internal conflict due to loyalty problems. Tribal al legiance is often 
stronger than loyalty to the government. It has often been the case 
that African military forces have been shown to perform more effec­
tively in conflicts with other countries than in internal conflicts.17 A 
sluggish and barely effective national military mobilisation of the people 
in support of the government also gives insurgents plenty of time to 
establish sources of finance and build up a relatively effective mili­
tary organisation. If the insurgent movement has plenty of time dur­
ing the critical initial phase to develop an infrastructure and can re­
cruit relatively freely, the war against the insurgency will naturally be 
correspondingly protracted. It should be noted in this respect that 
conflicts in Africa not only last longer than conflicts on other conti­
nents, but they also end more seldom in the government side win­
ning. 
Another possible reason may be that it has proved to be easier 
for insurgent movements in Africa and Asia to recruit 'angry young 
men' with bleak future prospects than in other parts of the world. 
Access to relatively simple hand weapons, even to a modest extent, 
may, if the local authorities are weakly formed, provide a dispropor­
tionately strong basis for the execution of power by those who have 
access to such weapons, something that may contribute to conflicts 
dragging on. Taking part in an insurgent movement also eventually 
becomes a form of lifestyle and the only way that many 'angry young 
men' know how to live. Without war they would be unemployed. 
Those guerrilla groups that want the war to be concluded after nego­
tiations often experience problems in controlling their own forces. At 
least parts of these groups may regard their interests as best served 
by the warfare continuing, so that they can have work and continue 
to enjoy financial security. 
17 The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is an example of how two previously allied African 
insurgency movements ended up in a protracted conventional war. The Ethiopian forces in 
particular demonstrated good military proficiency here. 
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We have seen that insurgent wars have many different and com­
plicated roots and occur in many forms. If a well-organised insur­
gency has acquired a good footing and the broad support of the 
people over a period of time, it is a very demanding task to suppress 
the uprising, even with a strong military force at one's disposal .  That 
is why military means alone are seldom sufficient in such conflicts. 
Other measures must be cleverly used in addition if one is to succeed 
in creating a lasting peace. 
It is probably also difficult to find a modern conflict where the 
terrorising of the civilian population in areas controlled by insurgent 
forces has not been employed, often by both parties. In this regard, 
the term 'state te rroris m has been used for the force that a state 
employs against its own civi lian population that is receptive to a guer­
ri l la movement or that at least does notwish to support the govern­
ment forces in their fight against the guerri l la. We will probably see 
the use of some form of 'counter-terrorism' or other state terrorism 
in practically every single insurgency. It is then the civilian population 
that wi ll face the majority of the government forces' counter-insur­
gency.18 What will normally be the result of such a strategy, and can 
state terrorism function in connection with counter-insurgency? It is 
often keenly disputed in specialist l iterature what an acceptable strat­
egy for a government is. 
a. Counter-insurgency and other concepts for countering 
insurgency 
The term 'counter-insurgency', often abbreviated to COIN, more 
or less fel l  out of use in the US armed forces at the end of the 1970s. 
Seldom has a superpower so quickly revised its strategic evaluations 
and the assumptions behind the country's foreign policy as the Ameri-
1• At the beginning of the 1 980s, Guatemala's army identified several ethnic groups of Maya Indians as 
'collective accessories' of the EGP and classified the group as 'internal enemies'. In the area populated 
by the lxil Indians, between 70 and 90 per cent of all villages were burned. The Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH) described the killings and massacres of Indians in this and other areas as 'acts of 
genocide'. The EGP, which was reckoned, in 1 980, to be the strongest of Guatemala's insurgent 
movements was, after several years of this form of counter-insurgency, no longer any military threat to 
the government. (Based on an interview with P. Refsdal in June 2005). See also Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, 
pp. 141-149. 
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cans did in the middle of the 1970s. Even although, from the 1980s, 
COIN was no longer a common term within the US armed forces, the 
countries that the Americans supported politically and militarily made 
use of the techniques/tactics that were developed and described 
during the Vietnam War. So-called COIN operations were common in 
Latin America and elsewhere from the 1970s to the 1990s (particu­
larly in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and the Philippines). 
El Salvador in particular conducted a relatively successful counter­
insurgency policy targeted at an amalgamation of revolutionary groups 
under the name of the FMLN. That the government forces would 
succeed was by no means certain, taking into account that, during 
the introductory phase of the war at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
government forces lacked mil itary competence and often committed 
breaches of human rights. After the FMLN had conducted an unsuc­
cessful 'final offensive' from 1981-1983, the insurgency continued 
without any clear victor. In 1992, a peace agreement was signed and 
the FMLN went from being an insurgent movement to being a politi­
cal party.19 
The superpower that was clearly least in a position to utilise 
COIN was the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, this country made most 
of the errors we find described in international l iterature on this type 
of warfare.20 For their part, the British have, since the 1970s, con­
tinually further developed their experiences in Northern Ireland. Due 
to the restrictions that accompany counter-insurgency in a Western 
European country, 21 the British security forces developed sophisti­
cated COIN tactics with a minimum loss of human life on al l sides. 
Even although there is now officially peace in this area, there is stil l 
clear antagonism between the different groups in Northern Ireland 
(something that will be discussed later). 
"A.._Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp_ 141-145. 
"' lester W. Grau (translator/editor), The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in 
Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1 996). in particular see pp_ ix-xxviii. 
21 The most discussed action carried out by British forces was the killing of 13 Catholics on Sunday, 30 
January 1972 in the ci1y of Londonderry. The event. which became known as Bloody Sunday, largely 
contributed towards creating a concept of the British forces as the enemy among Northern Ireland's 
catholics. By comparison, hardly anyone other than those directly involved would have reacted to the 
killing of 13 civilians during a counter-insurgency in an African or Asian state. 
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At the end of the 1970s, the US closed down the many 
programmes and research initiatives within the area of counter-in­
surgency. All the experiences that had been harvested during the 
approximately 25-year-long period from 1950 to 1975 now looked 
like being thrown onto the 'scrap heap of history'. With President 
Jimmy Carter in the White House and defeat in Vietnam fresh in their 
memories, no one had any desire to take part in fresh attempts to 
combat insurgent movements in the Third World. But, as usual, it is 
not the individual great power that can freely decide by itself what 
the actual agenda will be in the many areas that we call the Third 
World.  In the last 30 years there have normally been about 20 wars 
going on at any time in just what we cal l  the Third World, and most 
of these have at some stage involved a form of insurgency or civil 
war. Today, the superpowers are also, to a greater or lesser extent, 
involved in several of these conflicts. (See the description in Chapter 
3 of modem counter-insurgency.) 
The concept of counter-insurgency has consequently acquired a 
fresh topicality today. The unexpected extent of guerril la warfare 
and terrorism directed at the American-led coalition forces and their 
Iraqi all ies in Iraq in particular has contributed to fresh interest in the 
topic. Also closely associated with the same problems is the rela­
tively new American concept of Stability and Support Operations 
(SASO) which is much used in the ongoing military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The concept of (Principles of) Military Operations 
Other Than War(MOOTW) has also been common in American mili­
tary literature. Nevertheless, the two concepts that were most com­
mon in English-speaking literature in the 1990s were probably Low 
Intensity Conflict(UC) and Non-State Warfare. 
Counter-insurgency can, according to American sources, be di­
vided into two main categories: unconventional war (UW) 22 and di­
rect action {DA). The United States Department of Defense defines 
UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, nor­
mally of short duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or 
zz Abbreviated to 'UW In Special Operations lingo. UW is one of the nine core missions of U.S. Anny 
Soecial Forces. 
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local forces who are, to varying degrees, organised, trained, equipped, 
supported, and directed by an external source. It includes guerrilla 
warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandes­
tine operations, as well as the indirect activities of intelligence work, 
subversion, sabotage, and evasion and escape. 23, 24 
It has generally often been common to include concepts such as 
insurgency/counter-insurgen� terrorism/counter-terrorism and peace 
enforcement in the UC concept. The concept of Peace Support Op­
erations (PSO) can perhaps also be included but there are clearly 
divided opinions on this in literature. However, the concept of peace­
keeping is not included in the current definition of the UC concept. 
This is because it is usually emphasised in connection with peace­
keeping that one should notactively use armed force to solve a mis­
sion . Most of those who use the UC concept also specify that, in 
addition to making use of military force, it is also necessary for so­
cial, economic, humanitarian, legal and diplomatic measures to be 
taken. A problem with the UC concept in the manner in which it is 
normally used in literature is that it is definitely a Western term. At 
the same time, this signals Western thinking and experiences as re­
gards this form of war/warfare. The rest of the world does not nec­
essarily think of warfare in the same way as we do in the West. It is 
not uncommon for those in the Third World to have different atti­
tudes with regard to what is right and wrong when waging war. 25 In 
other words, the definitions vary depending on the source, but the 
concepts are generally used to describe a lengthy political/military 
conflict between an insurgent movement and a ruling regime, nor­
mally internally in a Third World country. 
23 See Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (April 1998): 'Unconventional warfare. A 
broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted 
by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in 
varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility; 
covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence 
activities, and evasion and escape (E&E)'. 
24 For an unauthorised definition, see htto://en.wikipedia.org!wiki/Unconventional warfare 
25 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow 
Books Ltd. ,  The Random House Group Ltd., 2003). The book shows with great clarity what can happen 
when a conftict gets totally out of control. General Dallaire was 'force commander' for the unsuccessful 
U N  mission in Rwanda in the earty 1 990s. The book describes the consequences the combination of 
ethnic and social opposites can have. 
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If one follows the debate in the Western specialist military jour­
nals and English language specialist literature, there has been a con­
stant debate since the mid-19905 about which trends or 'ideologies' 
have been dominant with regard to the many insurgencies in the 
Third World in particular. A common view has been that, within the 
leadership of the many insurgencies during the Cold War, the Marx­
ist-Leninist or Maoist ideological platforms have dominated but that 
these are well on the way to having been replaced by a new preoccu­
pation with national or ethnic identities. 26 Others have asserted that 
many of the insurgency leaders have focused from an early stage on 
identity problems but that, due to the situation where two superpow­
ers dominated the picture during the entire Cold War, the majority of 
insurgencies were put into a political/economic context with associ­
ated labels. It was 'anti-capitalist' rhetoric in particular that domi­
nated during the entire Cold War. The truth is probably instead that, 
at ground level in the many insurgent movements, it was rarely the 
case that reality fitted directly in with the simplified picture of capital­
ism versus Communism. It is likely that growing nationalism and 
identification with a local group were more important as a basis for 
recruitment for most of those who reported to actively take part in 
wars than a great desire to introduce an idealistic Marxist-Leninist 
social system or other similar dogmatic notions of the future. 
The possibility of being sponsoredin connection with a planned 
or ongoing insurgency was very much present during the latter part 
of the Cold War. If the government one wanted to fight against was 
supported by one of the superpowers, there was always the possibil­
ity of the other superpower wanting to support the insurgents. In 
insurgent movements that desired socialist-inspired social reforms, 
the sponsor was usually the Soviet Union and sometimes also China 
and smaller countries such as Cuba and Libya. In conflicts that have 
clear ethnic overtones, we should always study who they were fight­
ing against if we are to understand which superpower directly or 
indirectly may have supported the insurgent movement. Areas of 
'" An example of a researcher who has emphasised this type of evaluation is Mary Kaldor, Nya och 
gamla krig: Organiserat vflld under globaliseringens era [New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a 
Global Era) (Gothenburg: Bokfortaget Daidalos AB, 1 999). 
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protracted conflict such as Eritrea ( 1961-1993), Angola (UNITA was 
established in 1961 and waged war against various opponents al­
most without interruption up until 2003), and the Palestinians ( dur­
ing the time in the 1970s when they were strong in the Lebanon) are 
all examples of conflicts where ethnicity has been of great impor­
tance. The examples mentioned here are natural ones to study if we 
wish to acquaint ourselves with the patterns of behaviour in ethnic 
conflicts. It is also possible that several insurgent movements used 
(and are using?) rhetoric to attract a sponsor, such as, for example, 
the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and UNITA in Angola .  Both clearly 
used 'anti-Communist' rhetoric but were, in practice, nationalist and 
ethnic respectively. 27 
It should be noted here that, during the Cold War, the many 
revolutionary movements were often seen as an expression of rivalry 
between the two superpowers, but this is probably also too simple a 
method for describing the realities. The question is who took advan­
tage of whom? Is the insurgent movement using a superpower as a 
'sponsor' or was it the superpower that used the insurgent move­
ment in the game for control of the Third World? Or was it often 
quite simply more a case of a series of 'marriages of convenience' 
between a sponsor and the insurgent movement in question than 
anything else? This form of warfare has, however, also continued 
after the end of the Cold War. This could be seen as possible evi­
dence that these wars have their own internal lives. Another impor­
tant factor may be that the remaining superpowers have, in order to 
secure their own and what are seen as Western interests, been in­
volved since the end of the Cold War in combating various forms of 
revolutionary groups in the Third World. The best-known examples 
are probably the attempts at countering insurgencies and drug bar­
ons in Colombia and the stil l ongoing so-called 'war against terror­
ism' in Afghanistan and Iraq among other places. 
An interesting observation is also that research into insurgent 
wars has come a bit further since the first wave of literature on counter­
insurgency in the 1960s. These were books and articles that were 
77 Joes, GuerriHa Warlare, pp. 161 -165. 
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often based on the actual authors' own personal experiences. When, 
from the spring of 1965, the Americans began their increasingly se­
rious military intervention in Vietnam, more research-based litera­
ture began to appear. The research institution, the RAND Corpora­
tion, in particular played a key part in this gradually extremely wide­
spread research work. The best of these reports are also of a very 
high standard, measured against today's research. This was never­
theless a conflict with a completely different tradition to those that 
European research from the 1970s was preoccupied by and which 
was characterised by analyses of organisations such as the IRA and 
RAF, etc.28 
b. Factors that influence developments 
Another important set of relatively new factors that influence 
developments today are the consequences of so-called globalisation . 
Over the course of the last 20 years, this has led to a significant 
transformation of social, economic and political conditions at a global 
level . Overal l ,  this has led to a need to develop new analytical con­
cepts when trying to gain an overall view of experiences from the 
actual confl icts, at the same time as studying relevant theories about 
this type of warfare. The American Thomas Barnett is one of those 
who address this in his book The Pentagon's New Map. In this, he 
divides the world into those who embrace/are positive towards the 
ongoing globalisation \connected), and those who do not want to 
participate for various reasons \disconnected). The way he sees it, 
it would be a good American policy to establish a strategy to get 
onboard those states that are not involved in global development. 29 
The main idea behind his thinking is that nations that have intensive 
economic contact/trade with each other have established a certain 
dependency within the economic area, which makes it less l ikely that 
they will go to war with each other. The more countries that partici­
pate in this col laboration \connected'), the less risk there is of con­
flict. It obviously remains to be seen whether there is any real ism in 
Barnett's thinking. It can hardly be expected that there will be any 
'" The abbreviation IRA stands for Irish Republican Army and RAF for Red Army Faction. 
"' Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004). 
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 2, No. 3 
421 Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Some Concepts and Problems 
rapid transition to this type of concept in Europe, particularly when 
we see the scepticism that prevails within several leading EU coun­
tries and also in parts of the Third World to this new concept. 
Even if new definitions of concepts such as insurgency, revolu­
tionary war, guerrilla war and terrorism, etc., have been continually 
developed over a period of time, there is nevertheless stil l  no com­
plete agreement as to what the individual definitions should describe. 
Today there is, however, much agreement that the concept of insur­
gency describes internal war within a state/nation. It can be seen as 
the key overall concept in the many wars ongoing between an oppo­
sition or insurgent group and a ruling regime, but the concept says 
nothing of any external support from other actors. The assumption is 
that the parties have employed force in order to reform, revolutionise, 
transform or preserve the legitimacy of a state system. Political con­
trol is normally based on the four following important political frame­
work factors: 
1 .  That one is i n  a position to secure one's own state's borders and 
the survival of the actual state. 
2. Ensuring that the political systems of the state survive. 
3 .  Safeguarding/protecting those who have the authority to gov­
ern the state (possibly on behalf of the people). 
4. That politics can be conducted in a way that one can lawfully 
decide who is to get what in the community. 
Much of the political struggle wil l  normally be over who is to 
carry out the four points above and there are few if any rules laid 
down in this field .  The different insurgencies will always have their 
basis in local conditions, and priorities wil l  consequently vary from 
country to country. Some examples may il lustrate the differences in 
objectives: 
1 .  The 'Tamil Tigers' in Sri Lanka, the Abu Sayyaf group in the 
Philippines and the Polisario guerril las in the Western Sahara 
(stil l  a de facto part of Morocco even if several countries have 
acknowledged the area as a separate state) are al l  trying to 
break away from the three current nation states in order to set 
up separate states. 
2. The two insurgency movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria 
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(GIA) in Algeria, wish, on their part, to assume government in 
the states in question, i .e., to take charge themselves as the 
new governing party. 
3. A third form of insurgent activity is represented by what the 
Ulster Defence Association has stood for in Northern Ireland. 
This may perhaps be regarded as meeting terror with 'counter­
terror� an insurgency against a 'counter-insurgency'? It could 
possibly be asserted that violent Protestant paramilitary groups 
such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Free­
dom Fighters(UFF) had a similar function to the so-cal led death 
squads in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nor were many of these 
groups in Latin America under the direct control of the authori­
ties but they regarded themselves as a tool in the established 
counter-insurgencystrategy. Such groups normally wish to main­
tain the traditional political system by preventing changes to 
this. (They fear that changes would weaken the group's political 
influence, as the leaders have interpreted the local situation .) 
4. Insurgent movements of the nature of those seen in latter years 
in, for example, Iraq and Chechnya all wish to remove the rela­
tively recent occupation of their (ethnic) areas, but it has often 
proved to be the case that this type of group has lacked clear 
plans as to what wil l  happen after their goal of independence 
has been achieved. The result of such a lack of a perspective of 
the future is perhaps a new round of civil war when the first 
objective has been achieved - national independence. 30 
In other words, the various forms of insurgent movements nor­
mally have extremely different objectives in their warfare and use of 
violence.31 Some want to set up a new state while others are prima-
30 Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., (ed.),  Encyclopedia of Modem Ethnic Connicts (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2003), pp. 94-99. A classic example of independence not necessarily leading to lasting peace 
and a balance between ethnic groups is provided by India. First, the British colony of India was split 
into two parts: India and Pakistan. Pakistan has since been divided again into Pakistan and Bangladesh 
and, during this entire time, small guerrilla wars or terrorism have gone on in what has today become 
the regional superpower, India. In federal states such as Punjab, Kashmir and where, for example, 
ethnic tribes such as the Naga and Mizo have kept a protracted insurgency going in the state of Assam 
with the assistance of Communist organisational principles. Finally, they were given their own tribal­
based state - Nagaland, in 1 963. Once one tribal area was given its freedom, the others demanded the 
same. During the period, 1 972-1987, Assam was divided into 7 federal provinces. It has not, however, 
ever been possible to achieve a new and lasting stability in this north-eastern part of India. 
31 It has been stated that almost 1 00,000 'soldiers' went to various training camps in Afghanistan during 
the period 1 980 to 200 1 .  The Pakistani intelligence service, ISi, for instance, ran several training camps 
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rily occupied with securing a better and more just (local) socio-eco­
nomic order. Over the last few years we have also seen the develop­
ment of so-called theocracies, i .e., where it is desired to establish a 
new state order based on religious laws. More extreme groupings 
want the introduction of Western-inspired democratic arrangements 
and perhaps to go in a more social democratic direction. But a strong 
desire to avoid any changes at all may be the cause of an insurgency 
- and then it is obviously very difficult to see the insurgents as 'revo­
lutionaries'. Seen in this way, it is necessary to study each individual 
case if one is to have any hope of understanding why and how an 
insurgency arises and how it may develop. This complexity as re­
gards the many insurgent and guerrilla movements makes it neces­
sary to look at insurgent movements differently today than one did in 
traditional counter-insurgency literature from the 1960s. Here it was 
assumed that one was dealing with a form of social and nationalist 
insurgency directed at a ruling regime and where it was often a Com­
munist cadre that formed the leadership. In short, the situation to­
day requires a careful examination of each individual insurgency if 
the driving forces behind the insurgency are to be understood. 
According to Professor Ted Robert Gurr, there are three stages 
in the development of a society that can lead to the people support­
ing insurgency or terrorism directed at the ruling regime. Gurr looks 
at the gap between aspirations and the ability to realise these. If one 
sees one's ability to, for instance, earn money suddenly disappear 
while continuing to expect the same lifestyle as before, the gap be­
tween aspirations and reality wil l  increase. Similarly, if one gradually 
sees the situation improve, expectations will increase in step with 
this improvement. If then the opportunities to realise aspirations at a 
certain stage begin to lag behind, the gap will again increase. The 
third 'scenario' is a society where one actually has a stable relation­
ship with one's surroundings and one's ability to earn money. If, un­
der these circumstances, one is promised 'the promised land: one's 
in Pakistan during the war in Afghanistan ( 1 979-1 989) where the majority of participants were Afghans. 
Later, camps were also run by various warlords, the ISi and the Taliban regime when they took over 
power in the country during the period from 1 990 to 2001 . The terrorist group Jemaah lslamiyah in 
Indonesia is an example of such a group. It was members of this group that, among other things, 
carried out a series of bomb attacks in Indonesia in 2002 and 2003. The probably best-known attack in 
Indonesia so far was carried out in Bali in October 2002 when 202 people were killed. 
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expectations will rise. If reality does not then change, this aspirational 
gap wil l  again increase and be able to create fertile soil for discon­
tent, frustration and gradually less resistance to those who create 
opposition to the regime. The ruling regime will over a period of time 
be regarded as responsible for the lack of personalprogression .32 
c. The concepts of irregular armed forces, 
UC and insurgency 
By way of introduction, it may be appropriate to introduce the 
concept of irregular armed forces. This concept is often given a broad 
and negative definition, as almost all 'militarised' insurgent or op­
pressive actors fal l  into this category. The terms that are often used 
in the English vocabulary when discussing what irregular armed forces 
involve are militias, paramilitaries, guerrillas, mercenaries, warlords, 
bandits, vigilantes, veterans, police and possibly also militarised youth 
groups (gangs). It is exactly because this concept has been defined 
as widely as it is, that I will largely avoid it in this book. Instead, I wil l  
place greater emphasis on the terms that will be introduced below. 
The uniformed and conventional state armies that defend a state's 
independence against external enemies cannot, on the other hand, 
be called irregular forces. 
One of the first military writers to use the term Low Intensity 
Conflictwas the British General Frank Kitson.33 During the same pe­
riod, the term 'protracted wal came into use. 34 The UC concept has 
also been used to describe so-cal led 'UC strategies' and may then 
possibly be seen as a more informal American 'strategy' whose roots 
go back to the beginning of the 1980s. (It is, however, disputed 
whether this can be regarded as a strategy.) Ivan Molloy has pre­
sented the concept in an alternative manner: 
32 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Fourth Printing, 1 974), 
pp. 28-29. These theories are further developed in a newer book written by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara 
Haff. Ethnic Conffict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1 994), Chapter 1 ,  pp. 1 -14. 
33 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1971), see page XI. 
"' As an example of this use of the term, see the book written by R. Strausz-Hupe, W. R. Kintner, J .  E. 
Dougerty, A. J. Cottrell, Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy (New York: 
Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row, publ., 1 963). 
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( . . .  ) UC remains the foremost and most effective means by which the 
United States can combat threatening revolutionary nationalism when 
direct intervention is not an option.  Or alternatively, it remains the 
pre-eminent strategy for preparing the ground for direct and 'just' US 
military intervention in foreign target states. As such, this most effec­
tive strategy has continued to be used either fully or partially by the 
United States, and indeed other states, since the 1980s and its origi­
nal emergence in the Philippines and Central America. Used to fight 
wars when 'it is not fighting wars', UC remains one of the most endur­
ing legacies of the Reagan era. ( . . . ) 35 
Insurgency and insurgent movements are not in any way any­
thing new. Insurgency has always existed, normally in the form of 
people taking up arms to counteract what they feel is unfair treat­
ment from rulers. In doing so, they are (in the vast majority of cases) 
reacting to impulses or pressures from others. But if this is to de­
velop into an organised and well-led insurgent movement, often with 
its starting point in an almost spontaneous insurgency, it is required 
that those behind the insurgency are able to develop a politically 
educated leadership. The insurgency may also be directed against a 
foreign influence or against a direct occupation by forces from out­
side the region supporting the movement and is then often cal led a 
resistance movement. Nevertheless, insurgencies or resistance move­
ments wil l be violent activities that are carried out by a weaker party 
and directed at those in power. Guerrilla warfare has historically shown 
itself to be the most effective means of organising an insurgency for 
the weaker party. A certain use of terror has normally been an 'inte­
gral weapon' in al l  guerrilla warfare. 
One should note here that not all insurgencies develop into guer­
rilla wars or a resistance movement such as those directed against 
Nazi Germany in occupied Europe during the Second World War. The 
English terms insurgency and insurrection are often lumped together 
in translation as insurgency even if there is a difference in meaning 
between the two terms. The terms actually assume that the insur­
gents have introduced a Western concept/thinking in connection with 
30 Ivan Molloy, Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict (London: Pluto 
Press, 2001 ), p. 1 .  
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 2, No. 3 
Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Some Concepts and Problems 426 
the insurgency, i .e., that they have a clear political objective and are 
led by a recognised leadership. 
An individual variant of this has been so-cal led revolutionary 
warfare. This concept also has an assumption : that a revolution is 
desired and that this is based on the concept that individual people 
or groups have rights and not just obligations to a ruling class or 
group. When politics is injected into the insurgency, one gets at the 
same time a notion that a society can be changed and that this can 
be done systematically. As we see, it is difficult to give insurgency 
warfare only one definition. There are consequently at least a hun­
dred such definitions in literature today. Professor Thomas A. Marks, 
for example, who is the author of one of the more accepted books 
about so-called Maoist movements, attaches importance to the fol­
lowing factors: 
1 .  H e  assumes that different levels of warfare exist. 
2. On this basis, he asserts that an organised insurgency makes 
use of force as a strategic support for a political goal .  At an 
operational level, the insurgents will use force to develop a po­
litical infrastructure, something that will, at a tactical level, make 
it possible to secure political dominance. 
3 .  In  other words, insurgent wars are a political struggle in which 
the use of force is central and where power is fought over by 
forceful means. 36 
The American Larry E. cable has described the phenomenon in 
the following manner: 'Insurgency is the armed expression of or­
ganic, internal political disaffiliation'. 37 A somewhat different defini­
tion that also describes modem insurgencies has been worded as 
follows by Bard E. O'Neil l :  
Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group 
and the ruling authorities in which the on-ruling group consciously 
35 Thomas A. Marks. Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass Ltd. ,  1 996). pp. 1-18 .  
Particular attention should be paid to his explanation on p.  4. 
" Larry E.  Cable. 'Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Peacekeeping 
Post Cold War', Small WatS and Insurgencies, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Autumn 1 993), pp. 228-262. The definition 
comes from p. 229. 
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uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, 
and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain 
the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. 38 
O'Neill also goes a little further and divides the different forms 
of insurgent movements into what he calls 'types' where he uses 
terms such as 'anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, seces­
sionist, reformist and preservationist' to describe the different groups. 
On his part, cable states: 
While insurgency exists in two forms, offensive and defensive, with 
the distinction being drawn upon the basis of the overarching political 
goal, a radical restructuring of the social-political matrix in the case of 
the former or the assertion of autonomy by a distinct social, cultural 
linguistic group with respect to the latter, the process which produces 
the end result of armed conflict is the same. 39 
In other words, he is saying that, if an insurgent movement is to 
be a lasting success, it is necessary to create a political platform -
and the members must, in addition, have a strong desire to create 
change and be willing to use force to achieve their goal .  
Accordingly, it  would be difficult to see previous religious lead­
ers such as Buddha and Jesus as revolutionaries in this sense since 
they both desired a peaceful change to the state of affairs by spread­
ing their teachings. 
If it is appropriate to see insurgency as a political phenomenon 
where the fight for power is the central element, a whole series of 
methods that can be used to achieve this goal must exist. Normally, 
attempts at mobilising the people are a key element, but it cannot be 
excluded either that a so-called coup d'etat, for example, may be the 
basis for a change to the system.  Even if the golden days of Marxist­
Leninism as a spiritual source of inspiration are probably over, one 
should continue to have much respect for ideology as a basis for 
30 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & Temxism: Inside Modem Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey"s, 
1990), p. 13. 
30 Cable, 'Reinventing the Round Wheel', in Note 2, p. 229. 
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mobilisation. Today, a mixture of ethnicity, a struggle for national 
identity and religious conceptions is probably the most important 
mobilising factor in the insurgent wars currently going on.  
Seen in  isolation, ideology is seldom of any decisive importance 
because it is too elite-oriented in its form and the insurgents have 
historically nonnally only become a marginal group. One will, how­
ever, always see extremely devout cadres who can be will ing to sac­
rifice everything 'for the cause: cf., the Chinese cadres in Mao's China 
and what we see continuing in, among other places, Russia and East 
Gennany's elderly, unemployed and poor. In Norway, we saw the lay 
preacher Hans Nilsen Hauge's movement at the end of the 18th Cen­
tury function in a similar role. Notions of justice and all men having 
human rights can per se have a considerable mobilising force and 
should accordingly not be underestimated as a political explosive. 
An example from Europe's own recent past could be the Ger­
man Red Anny Faction (RAF), better known as 'the Baader-Meinhof 
Gang: which operated in Gennany in the early 1970s. The group was 
not able to mobilise the Gennan people, who were largely very con­
tent with the state of affairs, even although a not insignificant amount 
of terrorism was employed. Historically there have always been a 
number of fanatics who wish to bring about a revolution where the 
conditions for this do not actually exist. What the RAF had, despite 
everything, was a 'sponsor' in the fonn of East Germany, which indi­
rectly helped them to maintain their fight without popular support. 
The people need a good reason to create an insurgency - ideol­
ogy is probably never the only reason. A more tangible basis is re­
quired, such as, for example, an unfair division of economic benefits 
and/or a lack of a future for a large percentage of the population . But 
it may also be a matter of a struggle between power elites that use 
religion/nationalism/ethnicity, etc., as a means of getting national 
groups to inwlve themselves directly as insurgents.40 Alternatively, 
411 See, for example, Rekkedal, Asymmetric Walfare and Terrorism - An Assessment. This earlier book 
is in many ways the starting point for this new study. The text, which was written in the spring of 2002, 
has been rewrillen and extended. There has been much research and several studies carried out on the 
phenomenon al asymmetric -'are and parts of the intemational material have been used here. (See 
foolnom and bibliogiaptlies). 
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these means may be used to scare the population away from sup­
porting the side they feel has a hostile attitude towards their own 
cause. 
Several factors have been indicated that are part of getting people 
involved in insurgencies or revolutions. Some of the actual factors 
are indicated below: 
1 .  Demography - how could leaders such a s  Napoleon and Hitler 
raise their armies? Was it the availability of large groups of youths 
without a future or opportunities that was the decisive factor? 
Politics is about wanting to create or creating visions and belief 
in the future. A person who can succeed in giving young people 
between the ages of 14 and 30 a vision of a better life wil l  have 
secured himself an enormous resource. If we look at the situa­
tion in many Muslim countries today, there are large numbers of 
youths without any great hope of an education or well-paid jobs. 
This sets the scene for one of the reasons that Islamic extremist 
groups today recruit well from youths with a middle-class back­
ground who are on the way downwards in social status. 
2. Creating an external enemy can provide many opportunities for 
rallying a people. Then one can recruit in order to defend the 
country or, as is often the case today in Africa, in order to en­
sure that one's own tribe/national group can safeguard its threat­
ened rights. In this way, a clever leadership of an insurgency will 
be able to attract support from within and direct the actual ha­
tred against the groups they see as enemies of what they them­
selves wish to achieve. This type of organising provides, among 
other things, the opportunity to stigmatise rivals for power, 
whether they are hangers-on of the declared enemy or are only 
trying to find political solutions to a deadlock situation. 
3 .  Today, we also see the extensive use of ideology and religion as 
a means of mobilising local support within one's own ethnic group 
or within a social class. There is no absolute requirement here 
for the actual power elite itself to be very 'religious' but they 
must be able, in a credible manner, to organise active opposi­
tion to the ruling regime, to foreigners or to whoever is the 
actual 'enemy'. 
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4. What Form does Insurgency Take Today? 
a. Introduction 
Before the First World War it was common in Western mil itary 
literature to regard guerrilla warfare as a 'pure' mil itary form of war­
fare, i .e., warfare based on swift attacks against the enemy's weak­
nesses. Guerril la warfare was then regarded as a tactic and no politi­
cal dimension was attached to this form of warfare. Those who made 
use of guerrilla warfare were, for example, tribal warriors battling 
against a colonial power's soldiers. Alternatively, they could be an 
armed group continuing the war after a country's conventional forces 
were overcome by a foreign invasion force. During the Boer War 
(1899-1902) in South Africa, guerrilla warfare was used because British 
forces had developed a greater mil itary capacity than the Boers. The 
use of guerril la forces was actually less common. One must move on 
to the 1930s and 1940s to see that guerril la forces had developed 
into real revolutionary movements where the insurgents had clear 
political intentions of overthrowing the ruling regime and where clear 
ideological programmes had been developed which formulated ob­
jectives for the armed struggle.41 
b. Today's theories have a previous history 
Key people in the development of the mil itary and political ca­
pacity of revolutionary warfare are, for instance, Chairman Mao 
Zedong, North Vietnam's later President Ho Chi Minh, the North Viet­
namese General Vo Nguyen Giap, and the Secretary-General of the 
Communist Party Truong Chinh. The essence here is that a small 
cadre/group should over a period of time develop in such a way as to 
be able to combat the ruling regime and take over government itself. 
This involves making use of time and combining different subversive 
techniques, political mobil isation, propaganda and military battles. 
Such an insurgency, developed over a period of time, has also been 
shown to be able to take over states as was first seen in China and 
later also in countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia . 
" Ian F. W. Beckett. Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective, Monograph (Carlisle. PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), p. 2. 
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Before examining the different forms of insurgency below, it 
may be of interest to note some of the experiences drawn in the 
aftermath of the first so-cal led counter-insurgency era, in the form 
here of a summary written by one of the US's leading theorists and 
practitioners from this period ( 1950-1975), Douglas S. Blaufarb: 
The fundamental lesson to draw from our misadventures of the 
counterinsurgency era is the one already emphasized by many - the 
lesson of the limits of American power. It is also of importance that we 
should understand in what way our power, great as it is, can be chal­
lenged by a few thousand ragged jungle fighters armed with a dedi­
cated leadership, a tested theory, and great patience. Too many have 
fallen back on the easy excuse that we failed in Indochina because 
our power was constrained and leashed, that more bombs, more de­
struction, more firepower was the answer. At the end of this account 
of what we tried to do and why it fel l  short, it is to be hoped that some 
will be convinced that the failure was one of understanding, of inabil­
ity to perceive the underlying realities of both our own system and 
that of the countries into which we thrust our raw strength. 42 
If one is to study what is now going on within the many insur­
gent movements and terrorist organisations in the world, it may be 
useful to identify and categorise some of the trends that appear to 
dominate. It is, for instance, natural to study how those states and 
others subjected to insurgency and terrorism react. It is particularly 
interesting how the superpower, the US, has reacted after the acts of 
terrorism against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sep­
tember 1 1, 2001.  These acts of terrorism had an enormous psycho­
logical significance for the Americans and, in reality, led to the Bush 
administration changing its foreign policy with significant conse­
quences, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. 
( . . .  ) In a place like Iraq, you're dealing with the jihads that are coming 
in to raise hell, crime on the streets that's rampant, ex-Ba'athists that 
are still running around, and the potential now for this country to 
fragment: Shi'ia on Shi'ia, Shi'ia on Sunni, Kurd on Turkomen. It's a 
powder keg ( . . . ) 
42 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, US. Doctrine and Pelfomrance 1950 to the Present 
<New York· The Free Press 1 9n> DP- 310-311 .  
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This is a different kind of conflict. War fighting is just one element of 
it. Some people on this battlefield are different; they don't come in 
those formations and with that kind of equipment (as Westerners). 
And they come in many different forms. All their agendas are differ­
ent. 43 
As the above quote by the American Colonel Gary I. Wilson 
indicates, there are several theorists who assert that what is an al­
most new form of warfare has arisen over the last few years, tar­
geted at Western, and particularly American,. political and economic 
interests. I am at the very least sceptical about this. It is probably 
more correct to see the new form as a further development of guer­
rilla warfare and terrorism - phenomena that have existed in similar 
forms for the last couple of hundred years. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the IRA used an operational pattern that could be compared to that 
used by al-Qaeda on September 1 1, 2001 .  Instead of striking at the 
British in densely populated areas such as Belfast or out in the rural 
districts in Northern Ireland, they began a terrorism campaign in 
London and other cities of Great Britain. The campaign was never, 
however, sufficiently heavy to create a demand from the British people 
for the withdrawal of troops from Northern Ireland. On the contrary, 
the bombing campaign created British 'martyrs� which actually indi­
rectly led to increased popular support for taking a harder line against 
the IRA and the Irish Catholics. 
Muslim terrorist organisations had made clear (mil itary/politi­
cal) demands on countries such as the USA, Israel, and Spain, etc., 
both before and after the terrorist attacks of 1 1  September 2001 .  
The Americans often describe terrorism as an expression of hatred 
towards American ideals. Seen from the standpoint of the terrorists, 
the attacks were, on the contrary, a punishment against the US for 
what the terrorists believe the Americans have done, or are doing, in 
the Islamic areas. What al-Qaeda, for instance, has focused on in its 
propaganda since 2000 is that there were (previously) American troops 
in Saudi Arabia, that the US provided support to Muslim dictators, 
43 Gary I. Wilson, USMCR Rel., (Washington, D.C.: Renaissance, INFOWARCON, 1-3 October 2003), 
wilson@aol.com. 
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provided support to Israel and, obviously, they are against Western 
countries participating in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan/Iraq. 
Seen in this light, what is new is not that extremist groups are 
wil l ing to attack what they regard as legitimate targets, but that, on 
1 1  September 2001;  they were able to make a strong international 
impression with their attacks. 
What can also be established is that the attitude to the use of 
war as a political means and to the use of force is generally chang­
ing, particularly in Western countries. But this may stil l  lead to a 
problem in relation to the secular, but nevertheless 'Christian' West 
and the more radical Muslim factions. The latter have begun their 
mobil isation, as a reaction to what they feel is Western decadence 
and suppression of their religious and political interests.44 These de­
velopments will probably have consequences over a period of time 
with regard to what armed forces could be used for. This will, in the 
long-term, a lso influence when one wil l  be will ing to make use of 
such means, what type of capacities are acceptable and what kind of 
mil itary structure and type of troop are used. 
c. Theories regarding generations of warfare 
Over the last 10-15 years, particularly in the United States, a 
new mil itary and academic interest in the various forms of counter­
insurgency has been seen. In connection with this, during the same 
period, a number of books and journal articles were published with 
regard to two relatively new concepts. Concepts such as 'Fourth­
Generation Warfare ( 4GW) and ' The Three Block Wal have been 
introduced, but is not yet part of official American mil itary doctrines. 
Perhaps these ideas are not as new as the most enthusiastic advo­
cates try to make them seem, but this is, without doubt, a new twist 
.. Examples of such events and attitudes were seen in connection with the killing of a Dutch film producer 
in 2004 and in the demonstrations that led to a decision to cancel a controversial play in Birmingham, 
England, that same autumn. At the same time Western democracies are potentially attractive targets as 
scenes for terrorist attacks since one is presumably guaranteed dramatic media coverage and strong 
political reactions to a terrorist attack (cf., the bomb attacks against trains in Spain in 2004, which had 
significant political consequences). This act was even easier to carry out in Europe than in more totalitarian 
states due to the open internal European borders. 
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as regards the American military debate, which gives us hope of an 
increasing awareness with regard to the approach. 
Both concepts have their starting point in U.S. Marine Corps 
circles and both military and civilian theorists have contributed to 
developments. One of the first to begin to write about 4GW was the 
previously great champion of manoeuvre warfare William S. Lind. In 
an article published in the Marine Corps' journal, Marine Corps Ga­
zette, in 1994, he describes a broad outline of the problems that 
advocates of these theories have later developed. 45 
Several military thinkers have attempted to understand the war 
against terror that began on September 1 1, 2001 in the light of the 
term Fourth-Generation Warfare, which was coined by the American 
military theorist William S. Lind et al. in 1989.46 At the same time, 
there are many people who have wanted to differentiate between 
Lind's military theories and his controversial and cultural points of 
view; something that this author feels is an essential distinction. He 
has answered his critics in an article. 
William S. Lind is regarded as one of the founders of modem 
manoeuvre warfare theory. His book, Maneuver Warfare Handbook 
(1985), is still required reading at military academies in many places 
in the world, including the Norwegian military academies and at the 
Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm. In addition to his 
work on manoeuvre philosophy, Lind has written on a topic he calls 
'Fourth-Generation Warfare'. As previously mentioned, this subject 
was first i l lustrated in an article he wrote along with several others 
with the title 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth-Generation' 
as early as in 1985.47 In light of what happened later, and particularly 
.. William 5. Lind, 'Fourth Generation warfare: Another Look', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 78, lss. 12, 
(December 1 994), p. 34. A more recent key article on the same theme was in print in the same journal a 
few years later: William S. Lind, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', Marine Corps 
Gazette, Vol. 85, lss. 1 1 ,  (November 2001), p. 65 , 4. 
• William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, USA. Capt. John F. Schmitt, USMC and Lt. C. Gary I. Wilson, 
'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', Marine Corps Gazette. Oct. 1 989. pp. 22-26. 
47 William 5. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Lind has also 
written a number of articles in, for instance, Marine Corps Gazette. In 1 999, he was honoured by this 
magazine by receiving the title of Marine Corps Gazette Distinguished Author. Lind has visited Norway 
twice - in 1 999 at the Norwegian Military Academy and Naval Academy and in 2000 at the Military 
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September 1 1, 2001, 'the day that changed the world� it might be 
interesting to read Lind's article again.  It is particularly relevant in 
some areas. If we stick to the terminology that Will iam S. Lind uses, 
even states that adhere to 'Second-Generation Warfare' (2GW) or 
'Third-Generation Warfare' (3GW) can successfully use/exploit 4GW 
techniques.48 According to Lind and like-minded people, the genera­
tions can be described as fol lows: 
First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smooth­
bore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were devel­
oped partially in response to technological factors - the line maxi­
mized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of 
fire, etc.- and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, 
e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both 
the elan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted 
troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the 
smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics 
survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linear­
ity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not 
exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual command­
ers, most prominently Napoleon. 
Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, 
breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics 
were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially 
linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in 
the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. 
Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy 
reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in 
the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." 
Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second generation tac­
tics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are 
still practiced by most American units in the field. While ideas played 
Operations Symposium arranged by the Military Academy. William S. Lind has impressed many people 
with his knowledge of military history and strategy and with his analysis of modern military doctrines and 
training. He has also been provocative with his radical political and cultural points of view, which have 
put him far to the right in American social debate, even if he does not see himself as a so-called 
NeoCon. In The Atlantic Monthly magazine from 2002, it was pointed out in a commentary on the 
ongoing war in Afghanistan that a website associated with al-Qaeda quotes Lind's article as inspiration 
for the terrorists' strategy for fighting a new type of war against the West. 
48 William S. Lind, 'Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 85, lss. 1 1 ,  
November 200 1 ,  p .  69, 3 ;  Lind, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation'. 
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a role in the development of second generation tactics (particularly 
the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of 
change. Technology manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things 
as heavier artil lery and bombing aircraft, and quantitatively, in the 
abil ity of an i ndustrial ized economy to fight a battle of materiel 
(Materialschlacht). The second generation saw the formal recognition 
and adoption of the operational art, initially by the Prussian army. 
Again, both ideas and technology drove the change. The ideas sprang 
largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon's campaigns. Technological 
factors included von Moltke's realization that modem tactical firepower 
mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capa­
bilities of the railway and the telegraph. 
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in 
battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. 
Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their 
weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radi­
cally new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third gen­
eration tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied 
on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather 
than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in 
depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a 
counterattack. While the basic concepts of third generation tactics 
were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new technological 
element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in 
World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of 
the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell Hart's indirect 
approach) to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in 
the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd and his 'OODA (observa­
tion- orientation- decision- action) theory'. 49 
One of the most detailed descriptions of Fourth-Generation 
Warfare so far is written by the retired USMC Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes. In his book, he defines the phenomenon of 4GW in the 
following manner: 
Fourth-generation warfare ( 4GW) uses all available networks - politi­
cal, economic, social, and military - to convince the enemy's political 
" William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA). Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph 
W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), 'The Changing Face of War: Into 
the Fourth Generation', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 73, las. 10 (October 1 989), pp. 22-26. 
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decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or 
too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insur­
gency. Stil l  rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political 
will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and mili­
tary power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. 
Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by 
defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it 
directly attacks the mind of enemy decision makers to destroy the 
enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy - measured 
in decades rather than months or years. 
Clearly, 4GW is a very different concept from the short, intense war 
the (U.S.) administration planned for and celebrated by declaring the 
end of major combat on May 1, 2003. 50 
These theorists often regard themselves as an alternative to 
those who have primarily had a technological basis for their new 
military thinking with regard to future warfare. Those they have seen 
as their clear opponents - on the basis of the 4GW thinkers' own 
standpoint - have been theorists such as, for instance, John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt, who, early in the 1990s, went heavily in for the 
rapidly advancing data technology in particular as the basis for what 
they saw as a new form of warfare, based on what they called 
'cyberwar'. They visualised that in the future there would be short 
wars where all forms of high technology would play a leading part. 51 
One could possibly present/interpret Thomas X. Hammes' 
thoughts in the following manner: 
1.  'Idea-based warfare' - which means that groups that actually 
have/could have conflicting interests can nevertheless unite for 
a common goal. The actual tactics can be developed by the 
different groups individually. 
2. '4GW' can possibly be seen as a further developed form of in­
surgency. 
"' Thomas X. Hammes. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 2 1st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith 
Press, 2004), p. 2. 
"' John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming', Comparative Strategy, Vol. 1 2, No. 2 (Spring 
1 993), pp. 141-165. 
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3. Progress is measured, as he sees it, in decades and not years, 
something that is often difficult to understand for impatient 
Western· politicians and military leaders. 
4. Network-based insurgency or counter-insurgency (i.e., that all 
types of network can be included, not just technological ones 
are of importance to the warfare). 
5 .  There is no strategic focus on the enemy's strengths, and the 
focus is instead on influencing the enemy's political will by means 
of the political decision makers. 
6. One communicates simultaneously (entirely deliberately!) dif­
ferent messages to different target groups, via all available chan­
nels. 
7. Superpowers have all been defeated (several times) in this type 
of 'new conflict'. In order to avoid themselves (i .e., the insur­
gents) appearing as 'targets' for high technology weapon sys­
tems, 4GW is today the only current form of warfare that can 
succeed against a technologically superior opponent. 52 
In a draft from January 2005, Hammes has additionally devel­
oped his theories. Here he describes what he calls 'Characteristics of 
Fourth Generation Warfare' as: 
Fourth generation war uses all available networks-political, economic, 
social, and military-to convince the enemy's political decision makers 
that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the 
perceived benefit. It is rooted in the fundamental precept that supe­
rior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater eco­
nomic and military power. 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating 
the enemy's military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or 
civil disobedience with the soft networks of social, cultural and eco­
nomic ties, disinformation campaigns and innovative political activity, 
it directly attacks the enemy's political wil l .  
Fourth generation war spans the spectrum of human activity - politi­
cal, economic, social and military. Politically, it involves transnational, 
national and sub-national organizations and networks to convey its 
message to the target audiences. Strategically, it focuses on breaking 
"' Hammes, The Sling and the Stone. 
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the will of decision makers. It uses different pathway to deliver differ­
ent messages for different target audiences. The messages serve 
three purposes: to break the enemy's will; maintain the will of its own 
people; ensure neutrals remain neutral or provide tacit support to the 
cause. Operationally, it delivers those messages in a variety of ways 
from high impact, high profile direct military actions to indirect eco­
nomic attacks such as those designed to drive up the price of oil. 
Tactically, 4GW forces avoid direct confrontation if possible while seeking 
maximum impact it uses materials present in the society under attack. 
To minimize their logistics requirements they can attack using indus­
trial chemicals, liquefied natural-gas tankers or fertilizer shipments. 
Finally, 4GW practitioners plan for long wars - decades rather than 
months or years. 
In sum, 4GW is political, socially (rather than technically) networked 
and protracted in duration. It is the anti-thesis of the high-technol­
ogy, short war the Pentagon is preparing to fight. 53 
In sum, 4GW is politically, socially (rather than technically) net­
worked and is of a protracted nature. It is the antithesis of the high­
technology, short war the Pentagon is preparing to fight. 
4GW can accordingly be regarded as a basis for both a counter­
insurgency strategy and an insurgency strategy - something that 
could probably contribute to confusion among those with a Western 
cultural background attempting to acquaint themselves with this way 
of thinking. Mao Zedong's thoughts on protracted war have clearly 
been an important starting point, 54 but he states, sensibly, that prac­
tice must be developed and refined so that military and political mea­
sures are adapted to local conditions. China can be seen as an ex­
ample of a country/superpower that has concentrated very much on 
this type of activity over the last few years. 55 
53 Hammes, ·war Evolves into the Fourth Generation,' draft from 31• January 2006, electronic copy 
from Hammes to Rekkedal, October 2006 . 
.. Mao Tsetung, Om den langvarige krigen (On Protracted War] (Oslo: Forlaget Oktober, 1 976). The 
original was written by Mao in the Yenan province of China in May-June 1938, and the translation is 
based on a certified English translation done on the orders of Beijing in 1 963. (On Protracted War: 
Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung, Beijing, 1 963). See the chapters 'Hvorfor en langvarig krig?' 
['Why a Protracted War?'], pp. 36-40, 'De Ire stadiene i den langvarige krigen' ('The Three Stages of 
Protracted War'], (pp. 40-51)  and 'Krig og politikk' ['War and Politics1. (pp. 61-63) in particular. 
55 Published 16 October 2000: 'Year 2000 China Defense White Paper Document'. Translated by World 
News Connection, (http://wnc.fedworld.gov/subscription.htrnl). Details will be discussed later in this 
book. 
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 2, No. 3 
Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Some Concepts and Problems 440 
The 'Fourth Generation War' as a theory emerged as mentioned 
earlier in the late 1980s, but has become well known also outside 
mil itary circles due to the developments during the war in Iraq and 
the many international terrorist attacks. According to one of the crit­
ics of the theory, Dr. Antulio J .  Echevarria II, the theory 'has several 
fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before they can cause 
harm to U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A critique of 4GW is 
both fortuitous and important because it also provides us an oppor­
tunity to attack other unfounded assumptions that could influence 
U.S. strategy and military doctrine'. According to him, the theory holds 
that warfare has evolved through four generations: first, the use of 
massed manpower, second, firepower, third, manoeuvre, and fourth, 
an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks, 
i .e., political, economic, social, military, 'to convince an opponent's 
decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or 
too costly'. 56 
As Echevarria sees the development, instead of examining the 
way terrorists groups actually behave, 4GW-theory misleadingly 
pushed the storm-trooper ideals as the terrorist of tomorrow. In­
stead of looking at the probabil ity that such terrorists would impro­
vise with respect to the weapons they used box cutters, aircraft, and 
improvised explosive device, it posited high-tech 'wonder' weapons.57 
According to Echevarria, the theory went through what he called 
'a second incarnation when the notion of non-trinitarian war came 
into vogue', but it failed to examine these ideas critically. He claims 
the 4GW-theory 'is founded on the consequences of the so-called 
Westphalian system and the German theory of blitzkrieg. As Echevarria 
sees the development of 4GW-thinking, the theory reinvented itself 
once again after September 1 1, 2001, when some of its proponents, 
according to Echevarria, claimed that al-Qaeda 'was waging a 4GW 
against the United States'. The theory's proponents, rather than think­
ing critically about future warfare, became more concerned with dem-
" Antulio J. Echevarria II, 'Fourth-Generation War and other Myths', 
www.5trategicStudieslnstitute.army.mil, November 2005, pp.V-VI. 
57 Echevarria, ibid. 
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onstrating that they had predicted the future. According to Echevarria: 
'While their recommendations are often rooted in common sense, 
they are undermined by being tethered to an empty theory'. Echevarria 
concludes his harsh criticism with these words in his Summary: 
What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in 
Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased "dispersion and democrati­
zation of technology, information, and finance" brought about by glo­
balization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access world­
wide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more 
than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or 
defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies. We would do well to aban­
don the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light 
on this phenomenon. 58 
Of course, Echevarria's attack has been answered. The former 
U.S. Marine John Sayen has written an article called '4GW - Myth, or 
the Future of Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria'.59 He starts out 
with the view that nearly all the wars that have been fought in the 
last 15 years or so have had states involved on no more than one 
side (frequently the losing side), and that this fact changes every­
thing. According to Sayen, modem items like warships or fighter jets 
become, if not altogether irrelevant, much less useful against the 
highly dispersed and decentralised opponents that characterise 4GW 
conflicts, making it much harder to justify their cost. Armies geared 
for conventional combat tend to have difficulty with unconventional 
forces. The latter requires a completely new mindset from the state­
run forces. However, even if non-state entities acquired and used 
weapons like tanks or jet fighters (at least one drug gang actually did 
manage to acquire a submarine and Chechen militias even used a 
few tanks) they would still be engaging in 4GW because what really 
distinguishes 4GW from earlier generations is not the equipment or 
tactics but the identity and motivations of the people who fight it. 
Echevarria's reaction to this thesis is to deny all of it, according to 
Sayen. He avoids talking about the essentials of 4GW by insisting on 
'" Echevarria, ibid, p. VI . 
.. John Sayen, '4GW - Myth, or the Future of Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria', www. 
MILINET, 2005. See, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/sayen_ 4gw_reply.htm. 
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'using Col Hammes' flawed and erroneous definition of 4GW as his 
straw man. It is, however, an easy straw man to demolish so the 
good professor spills buckets of ink in doing so'. 
After answering some of Echevarria's attacks, Sayen concludes 
by claiming: 
Echevarria's silliest point by far is his assertion that the US military 
has it a l l  under control (Iraq, of course, being the perfect 
counterexample). He even makes the quite breathtaking assumption 
that the world wars and the Cold War were really non-state conflicts 
because the states that exclusively fought them made (and, when­
ever they chose to, broke) alliances among themselves! Even today, 
states rarely obey international authority except when their rulers 
deem it to be in their own (though not necessarily their subjects') 
best interests. Attempts by the United Nations to wield military power 
have almost invariably ended in fiasco except where the United States 
was legitimizing its own policies by draping them in the UN flag (as in 
Korea, for example). Even if an international organization acquired 
real power of its own it would in effect become a 'super-state' (better 
known as an empire). 
Far from eliminating the state system it would entrench it even more 
deeply. States, after all, are about the centralization of power, not its 
devolution. If a super-state were to fight recalcitrant states that it 
claimed authority over, it would do it as a state vs. state confl ict. Both 
sides would field conventional armies whose members wore uniforms 
and presumably expected Geneva Convention treatment if captured. 
Today's non-state actors are less than states, not above states. They 
don't devolve power up they devolve it down. A non-state does not 
need discreet territory, a ful l-time military or formal government. They 
are the revolution that the 4GW model depicts. They come from be­
low, not from above. Effective super-states, should any emerge, would 
not be part of this revolution but part of the reaction to it.60 
d. Warfare for the 21st Century? 
Supporters of 4GW have seen as their alternative to modern 
warfare what is, in the quotation above, cal led 'net war'.61 They see 
60 John Sayen, ibid. 
•• Some of the best known authors who have written about 4GW with a background from the U.S. 
Marines are: Colonel G. I .  Wilson, Colonel T. X. Hammes, Colonel Mike Wylie, Major John Schmitt, 
Gunny John Poole and Gunny Bob Howard. Important high-ranking military 
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the actual war as a complex and protracted form of conflict and 
which has its roots in, among other places, the theories that Mao 
asserted in what he called 'the way of the people's war'. As they seet, 
developments are now moving in the direction of this being probably 
the 'standard war' of the future. This is a philosophy that is undeni­
ably in contrast to the thinking behind terms such as 'Revolution in 
Military Affair5 (RMA) and ' Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), 62 which 
dominated in the 1990s and up to around 2001 in official rhetoric in 
the US63 and also in many European countries. 
William S. Lind formulated this as follows in an article published 
in January 2004: 
( . . .  ) Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over 
from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the 
Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its 
monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves 
fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, 
and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing. 
Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cul­
tures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing 
the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. Af­
ter about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the 
failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has 
resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direc­
tion. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at 
least as dangerous as invasion by a state army. Nor is Fourth Gen­
eration warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/1 1 .  At 
its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and 
that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Genera-
officials from the U.S. Marine Corps who have written about the phenomenon are: General Al Gray (29th 
Commandant of the Marine Corps). General Anthony Zinni (former Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Central Command) and General Charles Krulak (31st Commandant of the Marine Corps). There is a lot 
of written material by these writers on the Internet. 
62 Nils Marius Rekkedal, Central Features of the Debate on RMA and Network-Centric Watfare. Second 
edition. (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, Department of War Studies, 2004). 
63 Besides the concepts mentioned, the concepts 'Joint Vision 2010' and 'Joint Vision 2020· and the 
American Department of Defense's 'Transformation Planning Guidance' can also be seen as important 
symbols of the traditionally technology-oriented American philosophy of modem warfare. All concepts 
have conventional war as the theoretical basis for their military theory platform. 
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tion war on their soil .  America, with a closed political system (re­
gardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power 
a nd noth ing real ly changes) and a poisonous ideology of 
"multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety 
of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind. 6" 
Lind usually otherwise emphasises that what he calls Fourth­
Generation opponents are obviously not inclined to endorse the West.­
em-dominated Geneva Conventions. Terrorist. organisations or insur­
gents cannot fonnally endorse these either, because conventions can 
only be endorsed by states. But it should not be entirely ruled out 
that such groups would accept some fonn of 'soldier's code' as to 
how the actual warfare was to be conducted. He believes this is a 
feature of new war that should be assessed and investigated further 
- if nothing else, as a contribution towards keeping the use of vio­
lence down. 
The American General Charles Krulak, who was head of the US 
Marine Corps at the end of the 1990s, has discussed and written on 
many occasions on what he sees future trends to be. He has, how­
ever, developed a slightly different syst.em of concepts to the syst.em 
that Lind and later Hammes, for instance, make use of. Krulak is 
clearly of the opinion that there has been a significant shift in think­
ing surrounding military use of force. 
On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; On the other 
hand, you have to feed somelxx:ly. And, you have to build an economy, 
restructure the infrastructure, and build the political system. And 
there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down 
there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with 
NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and political wannabes run­
ning around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand. These 
are now culture wars that we're involved in. We don't understand 
that culture ( . . .  ) 
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and 
clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In 
the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart -
04 William S. Lind. "Understanding Fourth Generation War,' http://www.an!iwar com/!ind/ 
index.oho?artic!eid=1 702. 15 January 2004. 
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conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a 
highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three 
city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war. 65 
Based on the texts of Krulak's speeches, which are available on 
the Internet, we can summarise his thoughts as follows: 
1 .  Americans prefer conventional war as this type of warfare is 
normally to the advantage of the party that is strongest techno­
logical ly. For the same reason, an educated insurgent who uses 
'Fourth-Generation Warfare' will prefer to use what Krulak has, 
on several occasions, called 'Fourth-Generation judo' in order 
to, in this way, be able to meet American and Western depen­
dency on technology and 'throw us down' by exploiting our own 
bureaucratic heaviness and Western thinking against ourselves. 
2. Our enemies' 'technological advantage' as regards the Septem­
ber 1 1  attacks in 2001 consisted of a few simple craft knives and 
tin openers combined with a fanatical will to die for a cause. It 
served its purpose as this put the significant American military 
and civilian security systems' bureaucracy in a hopeless posi­
tion. The Americans were not able to do anything about what 
happened. 
3. Today, we see a development where the nature of the actual 
conflicts is changing . The previously clear dividing line between 
the contending parties, criminal elements and ordinary civilians 
is about to be erased. The modern urban soldier (and this fun­
damentally also applies to the guerrilla soldier out in the rural 
districts) may be anything from a religious fanatic to a child who 
perhaps fires an automatic rifle or RPG for payment. ( . . .  ) . 66 
There are, however, several similarities between what is asserted 
here and the thoughts that the military theorist Martin van Creveld, 
for instance, made himself a spokesman for in his 1991 book, The 
65 General Charles Krulak, USMC, (http://www.usefulreference.com/cee/ch/charles_c_krulak.html). 
Charles C. Krulak, 'The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas', presented to the National Press 
Club, Washington, D.C., 1 0 October 1 997, 'Vital Speeches of the Day', 1 5 December 1 997, p. 1 39. 
"" It is the writer of this book who has edited the' English statements, based on speeches given by 
General Charles Krulak during the period 2000-2002. See, for instance, http://www.nationmaster.com/ 
encyclopedia/Chartes-C.-Krulak. An example of this: in a specific small area of Belfast in Northern 
Ireland, a few too many British soldiers were shot in the head for this to be accidental. Contract killings 
in connection with terrorism therefore go back to at least the 1 970s. 
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Transformation of War, particularly if one looks at how he writes 
about future warfare in Chapter 7 of the book.67 Seen in this way, 
there were several military thinkers who, in the 1990s, began to look 
around for new interpretation models. Supporters of 4GW are, seen 
in this light, only one of several possible interpreters of the many 
local wars taking place. And to what extent the West should become 
involved in these is, of course, an important factor in the different 
opinions seen. (See also the bibliography with key sources on the 
many UC/guerrilla wars and how these can be evaluated.) 
If one is to attempt to briefly describe the existing trends with 
regard to the thinking surrounding today's guerrilla warfare and ter­
rorist activity, the following points can be mentioned: 
1 .  There is  a tendency for the wars that are going on at the mo­
ment to have more than one cause. Typically, there are two/ 
three categories that are to be taken into consideration: the 
struggle for political power, ethnicity, environmental factors such 
as water shortages/desertification and demographic pressure. 
There are many examples of poor people with a minimum of 
political influence being pressured into giving up their areas and 
having to move to less fertile places at the same time as the 
population figures rise. Emotive conflicts with some form of eth­
nic thinking or another are perhaps the most dominant cause of 
several of today's wars. The struggles against what many see as 
the occupations of Chechnya and Iraq can perhaps also be seen 
as 'ethnic conflicts' where the population opposes being gov­
erned by foreigners without an understanding of and/or respect 
for the local culture. Economic conditions are also always some­
thing lurking in the background but there is much to suggest 
that these are not of vital importance as regards if/when a 
conflict breaks out.6869 A good example of a local war like this is 
"' Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (London: The Free Press, 1 991) .  
60 Jeremy Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century (New York: Continuum, 2004). See, in 
particular, his discussion of factors in Chapter 3, pp.  69-118 .  
76 The UN Security Council possibly no longer has a composition that makes i t  possible to  look without 
prejudice at macro-political issues. The problems/scandals revealed with regard to Iraq's 'Oil for Food' 
programme and the tension between the institution itself and the US have created major and fundamental 
problems for the organisation. 
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the one that is stil l going on between black farmers and Arab 
nomads in Darfur in Sudan. The antagonism has built up gradu­
ally here and been intensified by an ideological crisis in the area. 
Under conditions like these, it is normally only a matter of time 
before another form of insurgency breaks out. The economic 
trends indicate that, in many countries, there are a few people 
becoming increasingly richer while the majority have the same 
or fewer resources - and this gap does not look like decreasing, 
particularly in the Second and Third Worlds. 
2. Another factor is that the UN, which was created at the time on 
the assumption that states were sovereign units, is today faced 
with the paradox that it has supported, on several occasions, 
insurgents against formal governments, on the basis of self­
determination for the people. According to the UN Statutes, states 
should not show aggression towards other states - on the basis 
of the hypothesis that if such aggression can be avoided, this 
will contribute to a more stable world. However, since the Cold 
War ended, we have seen a series of intra-state conflicts or civil 
war like clashes. One reason can be easily pointed out: if one 
tries to secure political autonomy for a national group and the 
host country does not accept an attempt such as this to break 
away, one is left with a war situation. The UN has then inter­
vened to the advantage of insurgents in East Timor, something 
that may contribute to other national groups that feel that they 
are more or less suppressed being encouraged into an insur­
gency. This wil l  obviously weaken those states subjected to in­
surgency, something that will hardly contribute to stability in the 
world. It is not easy to be nice to everyone. We can obviously 
ask rhetorically whether it is only the UN that has developed an 
acceptance of some ethnic conflicts, but not of others over the 
last few years. Perhaps our Western image of the so-cal led in­
ternational community is important for our evaluations? We can 
obviously also ask why the international community needed three 
years before intervening in the brutal Sudan conflict - when the 
facts have been well-known all this time. It should also be noted 
that both the UN and the majority of existing states do not wish 
to allow new states to be formed. There are grounds for ques­
tioning how forward-looking the existing fear of new states be-
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ing formed based on ethnic dividing lines is. The majority of 
borders, even in today's Europe, were drawn up in keeping with 
ethnic/cultural dividing lines, not economic ones. (This UN policy 
is now, probably as a result of recommendations from the panel 
that assesses the UN's future role and organisation, in the pro­
cess of being changed. In many ways, the UN system is now 
being given an internal 'reality check'.)76 
3.  The West has traditionally placed emphasis on technology and 
advanced weapon systems. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan 
and the 'continuation war' in Iraq, however, may serve as a 'wake­
up call? In the real world it is not machines that wage war, but 
people and their ideas that are the actual basis of the wars that 
arise. 
4. It is also a common notion that it is so-called 'low-tech ap­
proaches' that apply with regard to what theorists such as the 
American William S. Lind and like-minded people have called 
'Fourth-Generation Warfare'. In this, the use of alternative solu­
tions such as the actual tactics the weaker party uses has promi­
nence. This is, however, perhaps too simple an interpretation? 
Insurgents have, on several occasions, been able to successfully 
turn Western conventional military strategies and tactics into a 
handicap for Western forces. One should then, through inde­
pendent analysis, develop and adapt one's own tactical and stra­
tegic conditions to meet the conditions in question . The struc­
tures of the armed forces in many Western countries and also in 
the former Soviet Union have only, as yet to a limited extent, 
been able to adapt since the Cold War. The question one should 
then ask is whether the armed forces one possesses have adapted 
to the missions they face today.70 In the US in particular, since 
70 Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell/Orion Publishing 
Group Limited, 2002). In this book, van Creveld has, among other things, written about how an 'empire', 
i .e., a 'hegemonial' superpower can combat threats to itself. These threats typically come from the 
periphery, i.e., from the edge of the superpower's sphere of interest. They build up gradually so they are 
not initially seen as constituting a threat When they have become sufficiently serious then the 'hegemony' 
can take action. Success is achieved when the superpower takes the 'fight' to a local level and attempts 
to isolate the events so as not to spill over/spread to other parts of its own spheres of interest. They 
should then fight under the conditions that the local insurgent forces use and so avoid asymmetry. It will 
take time to defeat an insurgency. Creveld'.'P point is that, in connection with COIN, sufficient military 
capabilities/capacities should be deployed to exploit the options (in time and space) that exist. He sees 
what is briefly outlined here as being the method that has proved to be most relevant historically - and 
COIN is then an effective procedure for combating opposition forces. With the US's 'global reach' (i.e., 
the ability to project !!!.ilitim'....forces) this is at least a potential approach for the US. 
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the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there has been extensive discus­
sion about how the armed forces should be organised and 
equipped. The problem is that, after the conventional phase of 
war, they have had to maintain protracted operations in order to 
combat militant insurgents, who, together with criminal elements 
and foreign 'soldiers� have made it very difficult to re-establish 
an Iraqi Government. This has obviously been particularly com­
plicated as Iraq is very much split, ethnically and religiously. 
5. Another factor that is often underestimated is that warfare can­
not be seen as something that states have a monopoly on. This 
is also a basis for asking whether it actually ever has been. But 
in European thinking with regard to warfare, we have, for about 
350 years, often seen warfare as something that went on be­
tween states/countries and organised and recognised by these. 
This notion may perhaps be seen as a fixed point for all Western 
political and military thinking on war and warfare since the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648. It is likely that a more correct explana­
tion of this development is that not even during the 'glory days' 
of the nation states in the 17th and 18th Centuries were all wars 
in the European cultural sphere conducted between states. A 
great number of civil wars occurred in places such as France, 
Austria-Hungary and in Rnland. In the Third World, in particular, 
there is scarcely any state monopoly on power today of the type 
one would envisage as 'normal' in Western thinking. (This will 
be discussed later in this text.) 
6. If one looks more historically at developments, guerrilla warfare 
(including use of terrorism) and conventional warfare have of­
ten been used as political means to bring about changes within 
a nation state and to society as such. Democratisation and greater 
social justice have been part of a successful counter-insurgency 
strategy in several so-cal led 'social' insurgencies and the mea­
sures have, after a time, taken the edge off the insurgency, cf., 
developments in, for example, El Salvador and Guatemala dur­
ing the guerrilla wars of the 1980s. The insurgents had obvi­
ously wanted a total victory, but had to be satisfied with these 
'spin-off' results when peace had finally been concluded. Other­
wise it should be noted here that, even if resources and political 
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support may come from other nation states that sympathise 
with the insurgents, one decides oneself to stay out of the con­
flict. 
As some military theorists see it today, new trends are making 
their way into the traditional pattern. As regards 'Fourth-Generation 
Warfare', the insurgents like to use a mixture of terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare and other types of unconventional warfare as toolsfor chang­
ing a given society, its culture and attitudes. The insurgents may also 
oppose the nation state with the necessary supranational measures 
and means. 
The unusual thing is that it is often difficult to see that the insur­
gents have any clear ideology and/or declared objectives for what 
will happen if they are successful in taking over power. This particu­
larly applies in ethnic or resistance wars where the insurgents are 
fighting againstsomething (e.g., an occupation and/or what is seen 
as the ethnic predominance of another national group), more than 
where they are fighting for a new and more righteous social order 
(cf., examples such as Peru, El Salvador and, more recently, in con­
nection with the Maoist-led insurgency in Nepal) .71 
Ringkasan Artikel: 
lldak dapat dipungkiri lagi bahwa dunia sebenarnya telah banyak 
berubah sejak tahun 1960-an. Sumber inspirasi tradisional bagi 
kebanyakan perang pemberontakan selama paruh terakhir dari abad 
ke-20 merupakan versi berbeda dari beberap doktrin komunis yang 
telah jelas kehilangan daya tarik kuatnya dibandingkan dengan 
sebelumnya. Dalam tulisan ini penulis mencoba untuk memberikan 
kontribusinya terhadap perdebatan yang terjadi mengenai faktor­
faktor yang memicu terjadinya peperangan serta faktor-faktor yang 
membuat peperangan tetap ada, terutama di negara dunia ketiga. 
7 1  I t  i s  outside the framework of this book to examine the many ongoing conflicts in detail. Anyone who 
would themselves like to study in greater detail what characterises the ongoing ethnic conflicts can 
study, for example, Rudolph, Jr., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Modem Ethnic Conflicts. 
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Dalam tulisan ini dijelaskan beberapa konsep kunci dalam konteks 
penelitian atau konteks militer (dalam doktrin ataupun aturan) yang 
digunakan ketika menjabarkan bentuk-bentuk yang berbeda dari 
pemberontakan. Salah satu asumsi yang diutarakan penulis adalah 
bahwa semua perang pemberontakan berbeda satu dengan lainnya, 
karena tergantung pada keadaan lokal maupun regional mereka 
masing-masing, meskipun demimikan penulis juga berpendapat 
bahwa harus dicari karakteristik dasar tertentu dari bentuk-bentuk 
peperangan ini. Banyak hal yang mengindikasikan bahwa dunia telah 
berubah secara permanen selama beberapa tahun terakhir. Namun 
pada saat yang sama hanya sedikit yang mengindikasikan telah 
berubahnya alasan fundamental sebagian orang yang memilih untuk 
menugaskan angkatan bersenjatanya melawan musuh pol itik, etnis 
dan agama.  Faktor-faktor yang sering dirumuskan dalam teori militer 
menurut konsep (gabungan) hakikat perang, dan tampak sebagian 
besar konsep tersebut t idak berubah oleh waktu . Ha l  in i  
memungkinkan untuk dipelajarinya beberapa alasan awal mula 
terjadinya pemberontakan. Dalam perdebatan internasional yang 
sedang terjadi, beberapa komentator telah menarik persamaan 
mengenai beberapa hal antara gerakan perlawanan di Afganistan 
dan Irak dengan pemberontakan melawan kekuatan kolonial Barat 
yang terjadi sebelumnya, dan mereka menyatakan bahwa pendudukan 
ini dapat dilihat sebagai bagian dari pemikiran Amerika yang bemama 
'neo-kolonial'. 
Hampir seluruh model dan pemikiran terkemuka mengenai bagaiman 
negara didirikan dan bagaimana mengembangkannya adalah sama 
dengan yang terjadi di negara-negara Eropa Barat. Hal ini memberikan 
kita dasar untuk melihat secara kritis apakah teori-teori ini dapat 
degan mudah diaplikasikan di negara baru dunia ketiga yang tebentuk 
selama masa dekolonisasi setelah Perang Dunia II. Teori-teori yang 
sama mungkin juga memberikan penjelasan yang sederhan dari suatu 
sejarah panjang serta periode kekejaman yang berada di balik keadaan 
yang cukup stabil di Negara Eropa Tengah dan Ba rat sekarang ini. 
Pengamatan penting ini, menurut pandangan penulis, seharusnya 
menekankan pentingnya angkatan bersenjata non-reguler, seperti 
milisi, paramiliter, pasukan gerilya, tentara bayaran, perkumpulan 
bandit dan 'polisi' lokal yang secara bersama-sama membentuk 
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'angkatan bersenjata' di banyak negara dunia ketiga sekarang in i .  
Pasukan non-reguler d i  negara-negara tersebut setidaknya mungkin 
sama pentingnya dengan angkatan bersenjata reguler negara-negara 
tersebut dalam menangani situasi keamanan secara umum. Penting 
juga untuk dikemukakan bahwa pada beberapa negara dunia ketiga, 
legitimasi negara terus menerus ditantang oleh berbagai macam 
bentuk pasukan non-reguler yang beroperasi dalam batas-batas for­
mal negara yang sudah ada . 
Alasan lain konflik yang berkepanjangan, seperti yang disebutkan 
sebelumnya adalah berkaitan dengan perbedaan kelompok suku 
bangsa yang memiliki tradisi konflik berkepanjangan di antara mereka 
yang salah satunya "ditekan bersama" dalam suatu negara atau 
perbatasan yang menembus wilayah adat suatu kelompok etnis. Di 
masa modern, di Eropa memiliki, sebagai contoh, pertentangan antara 
Protestan dengan Katolik di Irlandia Utara dan Basque melawan Span­
iard. Konfl ik kelompok etnis yang paling terkenal yang belum lama 
ini terjadi di negara Balkan pada periode tahun 1991-1999, d i  mana 
negara dan kelompok etnis telah menggunakan kekerasan untuk 
menyelesaikan masalah mereka. Sekarang ini, hal tersebut mungkin 
menjadi ancaman utama terhadap keberadaan negara-negara dunia 
ketiga. 
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